GeoPrism

In October 2021, the Sudanese military, alongside a paramilitary group called the Rapid Support Forces, took control of the Sudanese government in a military coup. These two rival factions broke out into open conflict in 2023 following a power struggle, leading to the Sudanese Civil War which continues to this day. Amid the ongoing struggle over the right to govern Sudan, both regional and international governments have become entangled in the conflict to secure influence and further their strategic interests in the region.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) represent the internationally recognised government of Sudan, while the RSF were formerly an auxiliary force within the Sudanese government which resisted further integration into the Armed Forces. The RSF was formed from a militia group known as the Janjaweed, which fought on behalf of the government against insurgent groups during the Darfur War (2003-2020). The ideology of the RSF has been described as Arab-supremacist, authoritarian, and opposed to Islamism. The group has been accused by the International Criminal Court of committing genocide and war crimes against Sudan’s non-Arab population.

Sudan has previously experienced 20 military coup attempts, the most of any nation in Africa, and has historically been deeply divided along regional, tribal, and ethnic lines. While the UN has placed an arms embargo on the RSF stronghold of Darfur since 2004, this has not yet been extended to the rest of the country, and Amnesty International claims it has found evidence of weapons from several countries being used in Sudan including Russia, China and Turkey.

An international group known as the “Quad”, formed of the US, UK, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have attempted to sponsor mediation in Sudan alongside the UN and the African Union. However, the involvement of foreign powers entrenching themselves into the conflict continues to complicate peace efforts.

The RSF recently formed a rival government, leading to concerns that the country may split for the second time after South Sudan declared independence in 2011. South Sudan has attempted to mediate between the rival groups and has expressed concern over potential spill over of the conflict after clashes along the border between the RSF and rebel groups sympathetic to South Sudan. There are concerns that if these clashes continue, the war may extend across Sudan’s southern borders.

One of the main backers of the SAF is Egypt, which has taken a proactive role in the conflict due to its shared border with Sudan and the importance of the river Nile for Egypt’s prosperity. The Egyptian government regards the SAF as a more predictable and sympathetic actor than the RSF, and is keen to maintain stability along its border to reduce arms smuggling and irregular migration flows. The existence of a fragmented, militia controlled Sudan without a stable government is a prospect Egypt as a neighbouring country will be keen to avoid. Egypt has provided intelligence, tactical support, and is even thought to have conducted air strikes in support of the SAF.

Ethiopia has supported the RSF, in part due to its historically strained relations with the government of Sudan. During the Tigray War (2020-2022), Ethiopia accused Sudan, specifically the SAF, of exploiting the conflict by moving its soldiers into disputed border areas while its army was focused on fighting rebels within the country. Ethiopia will also be keen to counter Egyptian influence in Sudan, as relations with Egypt have been fraught partly by the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which will give Ethiopia greater control over the waters of the Nile.

However, in July 2024 Ethiopia’s Prime Minister met with SAF leader al-Burhan, potentially signalling a more balanced position on the conflict. As the RSF have begun to seize areas close to the border, Ethiopia appears to be growing more concerned about the impact of instability in its border regions in an already fragile area which is disputed between the two countries.

One of the most prominent supporters of the RSF has been the UAE. In 2018 the RSF deployed in Yemen to support groups backed by the UAE, and the RSF is thought to receive arms, drones, and logistical support from the UAE. The Gulf state has also been accused of benefitting from gold operations run by the RSF in Sudan, and sees the RSF as a favourable partner to gain access to red sea ports.

The UAE also have ideological reasons for their support of the RSF, due to its opposition to political Islamism in the region, which it sees a potential threat to its governance model that may otherwise spread across the region. While the RSF is opposed to Islamism, Islamist militias such as the Al‑Bara’ ibn Malik Brigade are fighting alongside the SAF and there are fears they may seek greater prominence in Sudan’s post-war government. The Libyan LNA led by Khalifa Haftar have also provided military support for the RSF, aligning with the UAE but diverging with the position of Egypt, one of their key backers in the Libyan conflict.

Saudi Arabia has also taken an active role in the conflict, in part to counter the influence of the UAE, and to support the SAF which has provided military support to the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen. Similarly, Iran has also provided support to the SAF to counter Emirati influence in Sudan and the Red Sea, but is thought to have also benefitted from selling drones to both sides.

The war in Sudan has also been the unlikely site of conflict between Russian and Ukrainian forces. Russia has grown increasingly close with the SAF since discussions began around the potential construction of a Russian naval base north of Port Sudan, and Russian support is thought to have been key in allowing the SAF to recapture much of the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. Russian paramilitary organisation Wagner is thought to have been fighting on behalf of the RSF until by 2024, SAF relations with Russia had improved, and the SAF denied that Wagner were still operating in Sudan.

In September 2023, it was reported as being “likely” that a series of drone strikes and ground operations against the RSF was orchestrated by Ukrainian special forces. Ukraine’s chief of intelligence neither confirmed nor denied Ukrainian involvement, but stated his intention of “hunting down Russian military criminals”. Ukraine has shown willingness to strike Russian targets well beyond its borders, conducting a strike earlier this month in the Mediterranean against a Russian “shadow fleet” tanker. Like many conflict zones around the World, Sudan has been a staging ground for rival and warring countries to settle old scores.

As in Libya, the war in Sudan has evolved far beyond a domestic power struggle into a complex confrontation of regional and international forces. The promise of greater influence and economic opportunity has led many countries to contribute to the prolonging of the war instead of prioritising genuine dialogue and compromise. Both warring sides have proved largely resistant to external mediation efforts thus far, and disagreement between rival backers in the conflict such as Egypt and UAE have slowed progress. As the war continues, the chance of further partition of the country looks increasingly likely, unless international actors show genuine willingness to compromise on their strategic ambitions.