Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya has been divided between two rival administrations. Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) controls Libya’s East, and the Government of National Unity (GNU) headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh controls much of the Western coastline. Only the GNU is recognised by the UN as the legitimate government of Libya, but the country remains separated into rival administrations, and has become an arena of wider geopolitical competition from third countries seeking greater influence in the region.
Fighting in the Second Libyan Civil War largely concluded in 2020 after 6 years of armed conflict, and since then the de facto areas of control have remained mostly static. Libya’s continued division can be attributed to a range of historical and political factors which have led international attempts at reunification to falter and yield little progress since the ceasefire of 2020.
Muammar Gaddafi’s regime came to power by military coup, leading a centralised, autocratic government until his toppling in 2011. Libya did not have an independent Parliament in this period; instead there was the “General People’s Congress”, which essentially rubber stamped-decisions already approved by Gaddafi and his revolutionary committees. As a result, when the regime fell, there was no state infrastructure capable of managing a legitimate transition. Regional, tribal and religious allegiances which had previously been suppressed under Gaddafi’s central authority were reignited, and the vacuum was quickly filled by local militias and regional power brokers, backed by international actors seeking influence.
The Tripoli-based GNU holds a moderate Islamist ideology, and is backed primarily by Turkey and Qatar, which have both historically backed Islamist leaning movements. The Tobruk-based LNA holds a more nationalist, conservative ideology, opposed to political Islamism and is supported primarily by Egypt, Russia, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian government led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was formed after the toppling of its former Islamist President Mohamed Morsi, and has since opposed political Islamism in the region which could pose a threat to its government.
Besides ideological alignments, external backers of Libya’s opposing sides are also motivated by the opportunity to extend their own influence in Libya while curbing the influence of their regional and international rivals. Moscow has used ties with Commander Haftar to secure access to military infrastructure, building a logistical network allowing it to project power into Africa, enabling it to provide arms to its ‘Africa Corps’, the successor to the infamous Wagner Group. Much of the Russian equipment evacuated from Syria after the fall of Assad in 2024 was transported to air bases in Eastern Libya.
The US response to Russian entrenchment in Libya has been to attempt to reorient Haftar’s allegiances away from Moscow with promises of security cooperation and training, and has organised high profile meetings aimed at accelerating unification of both sides. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, US and European governments have taken a more proactive approach in attempting to counter Russian influence in Libya over fears that a Russian stronghold in the Mediterranean could increase its leverage over Europe.
Despite this, while Haftar has shown willingness to engage with the US, his administration has shown little sign thus far of distancing itself from the Kremlin. There are concerns that if Haftar’s government continues to be emboldened by both Moscow and Washington, it may become disincentivised to engage in the unification process. However, despite their close ties, Russia has still not been able to secure a port in areas controlled by Haftar’s LNA, showing that there may be limits to the lengths his government will go to appease Moscow at the expense of relations with the US and Europe.
The military intervention and reinforcement from foreign governments to both factions in Libya has complicated the reunification process and contributed to a strained environment for democratic processes. In 2020, the UN Security Council found that both countries backing the LNA and those backing the GNU had violated the international arms embargo on Libya by transporting weaponry into the country. Planned elections have been postponed multiple times since 2011, as neither side has been concretely sanctioned for stalling the unification process.
Without a unified international effort to incentivise both administrations to agree to a concrete timeline toward unification, it is likely that Libya will remain divided for the foreseeable future. More robust enforcement of the UN Arms Embargo, with sanctions for violations, as well as greater investment into developing Libya’s relatively new democratic institutions, could contribute to a less volatile environment in which democratic steps can be taken. All of this will depend on a level of international consensus and the political will of external actors to prioritise stability over short-term strategic gains.
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