While Saudi Arabia and the UAE enjoyed close relations throughout the 2010s, Riyadh has been disturbed by the UAE’s increasingly independent foreign policy, as growing mistrust threatens to further ignite tensions in conflicts in the region and beyond. While still aligned in many areas, developments in Yemen present a concerning picture of the direction of relations between the two countries.
Shortly after the beginning of the Yemeni civil war in 2014, Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined forces in a coalition to defeat the Iranian-backed Houthis who had captured the capital Sanaa and overthrown Yemen’s government. While Saudi Arabia was primarily concerned with eliminating the threat along its borders and preventing Iran from gaining a foothold in the country, the UAE was focused on countering Islamist movements in the region.
These diverging interests would eventually lead to violent clashes on December 30th of 2025, as Saudi Arabia conducted an air strike on an arms shipment from the UAE to the Southern Transitional Council, a secessionist group formed in 2017 backed by Abu Dhabi. The UAE’s backing of the STC began after Yemen’s internationally backed government deposed a regional official, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, from his post for his ties with the UAE.
Additionally, unlike Riyadh, which tolerated and backed Islamist groups such as Al-Islah to help defeat the Houthis, the UAE was strongly opposed to their involvement, and it became increasingly apparent that the two nations had a different vision for post-civil war Yemen. The STC has now officially dissolved after a Saudi-backed offensive, but the UAE appears increasingly determined to challenge Riyadh’s designs for the region.
Elsewhere in the region, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are increasingly backing competing sides in conflicts. In Sudan, Abu Dhabi has backed the RSF, while Riyadh has offered support to the Sudanese Armed Forces. In Syria, Saudi Arabia has supported the government of al-Sharaa while accusing the UAE of supporting Druze separatist groups, though Abu Dhabi has not stated as much publicly. Somalia’s government has reportedly torn up agreements with the UAE, which has developed closer relations with the breakaway region of Somaliland, while Saudi Arabia weighs a new military alliance with Somalia. Israel became the first country to recognise Somaliland in December of 2025, and was thought to have been in talks with the STC in Yemen before the group’s dissolution. Riyadh appears to be increasingly suspicious of Israel’s growing willingness to disrupt the regional order and its relations with Abu Dhabi.
The UAE is also closely watching the proposed formation of a mutual defence pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, coined by some outlets as an ‘Islamic NATO’. Since the proposal of this alliance, the UAE has signed an energy deal with India, Pakistan’s primary regional rival, worth $3 billion. It has also walked away from discussions to manage Pakistan’s Islamabad airport. If, as some are speculating, Iran’s government is in danger of collapse as the US moves naval assets closer to the country, this could cause Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy interests to diverge further. As was the case in Yemen, much of their alignment in past years has been based on a common interest to constrain Iranian influence.
Complicating these new regional alignments is the creation of Donald Trump’s ‘board of peace’, primarily established to oversee the Gaza peace plan between Israel and Hamas. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are all members of the new organisation and will be hopeful to attract the goodwill of Trump, who increasingly appears to be aligning the US’ external relations more with personal relationships than with established institutional frameworks or long-standing strategic commitments. Participation in the initiative may offer regional powers a convenient way to signal pragmatism and relevance to Washington, and possibly help prevent further escalation among Gulf states.
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