Since 2020, Armenia’s relations with Russia have become increasingly fraught, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has signalled his desire to move the country out of Russia’s sphere of influence. Once Armenia’s closest ally, many Armenians felt a profound sense of betrayal and abandonment when Russia was largely absent and failed to offer any military assistance in its war with Azerbaijan in 2020. Since then, the country’s leadership has begun forming new partnerships that could significantly alter the security architecture of the Caucasus region and open up the nation to new political opportunities.
At the fall of the Soviet Union, both countries became independent states and joined the newly created Collective Security Treaty in 1992, becoming founding members of what later evolved into the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The CSTO was designed to be a military alliance of post-Soviet states, and similarly to NATO, its founding treaty contained a clause (Article 4) in which an ‘aggression’ against one member state will be considered an aggression against all. In this event, all other member states must immediately offer military assistance upon request, provided that an armed attack occurs “menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty”.
The CSTO was then put to the test in 2020, as Azerbaijan launched a military offensive against the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway state populated predominantly by Armenians, but internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan. This led to a full scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, which ended in military defeat for Armenia and subsequently the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh coming under Azerbaijani control.
Early on in the conflict, Armenia triggered Article 4 of the CST, but no military assistance was provided, and the CSTO mission that was sent in response simply monitored activity on the border. As anger and disillusionment at Russia’s inaction grew amongst the Armenian population, a national debate was sparked over the country’s alignment with Russia and many called for closer relations and even membership of NATO. Just 4 days after calling for Russian assistance, US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi made an official visit to the country, sending a stark message to Russia.
In the following years, Armenia refused to sign joint CSTO declarations, opted out of common military drills, and Prime Minister Pashinyan stated publicly that “dependence on just one partner in security matters is a strategic mistake”, and that Russia could not meet Armenia’s security needs. Armenia then formally froze its participation in the CSTO in 2024.
Later that year, Putin would state that he believed the CSTO had been under no obligation to intervene in the war, as there was “no external aggression against Armenia itself”, as Armenia did not consider Karabakh part of its territory. Despite this, many Armenians were disappointed that Russia did not offer even diplomatic or political support to its supposed ally as reports came in of shelling and strikes on towns and villages along Armenia’s border.
After Putin’s comments, Prime Minister Pashinyan stated in Parliament that “In a difficult moment, they left us alone, they abandoned us, and yes, there are opinions that we were betrayed”, and that his country’s involvement with the CSTO was “past the point of no return”. Since his election in 2018, Pashinyan oversaw a rocky relationship with the Kremlin as he was regarded as being more Pro-Western than his predecessors, and was described by some in Russian media as “Armenia’s Petro Poroshenko”. This factor, alongside Russia’s preoccupation with its invasion of Ukraine, likely contributed to Putin’s inaction and ambivalence toward Armenia as the country requested Russian assistance.
Since declaring its divergence with the CSTO, Armenia has been proactive in seeking closer relationships with other regional and global powers. In March of this year, Armenia’s Parliament adopted the EU Integration Act, calling on the government to begin the process of integrating into the EU, after positive responses from the European Parliament on Armenia’s potential membership bid. Among European states, France has stood out as one of Armenia’s strongest diplomatic supporters since the 2023 war and has sold air defence systems and other military equipment to Armenia.
Armenia also held military drills with the US for the first time in 2023, and in 2025 conducted military drills with Iran, whose leaders have grown increasingly cautious about a potential power vacuum as Russia’s influence in the region declines. Armenia has also cautiously softened its historically strained relations with Turkey, as Turkey considers reopening their shared border which has been shut since the first Nagorno Karbakh war in the 1990s.
Despite this, Russia still maintains thousands of troops within Armenia, and remains Armenia’s largest export partner. Russia continues to exert significant economic influence over Armenia and Armenia’s leadership will seek to navigate this dependence carefully as it seeks to redefine its foreign policy orientation. What is clear is that Armenia is undergoing one of the most dramatic foreign policy shifts of its modern history, creating new opportunities for engagement with Western institutions and partners.
Leave a Reply