The defence of the West occupies a central place in the political and strategic discourse of Donald Trump’s second administration. As China rises, Russia challenges European security and competition for global influence intensifies, the international position long enjoyed by Western powers is increasingly contested. Europe also faces economic and demographic difficulties, political tensions and debates over immigration, sovereignty and cultural identity — developments the Trump administration interprets as symptoms of a deeper crisis of Western civilisation.
This creates a geopolitical paradox. While Trump calls for the defence and revitalisation of the West, other aspects of his foreign and economic policies may already be weakening ties between the United States and Europe, the two principal pillars of the transatlantic order. Trade disputes, diplomatic disagreements and American decisions concerning Ukraine have exposed differences that raise questions about political trust and strategic cohesion.
The significance of this relationship extends beyond military cooperation. Western influence depends not only on American and European capabilities but also on their ability to coordinate interests, uphold commitments and act collectively. Strengthening American power does not necessarily strengthen Western power.
The central question is whether Trump’s policies are consolidating or eroding Western influence. Yet the issue extends beyond his presidency: are today’s tensions a temporary consequence of Trumpism, or do they signal a structural transformation? Even if political trust is restored, could growing economic and technological competition undermine the transatlantic partnership?
Two Conceptions of Western Power
The United States’ 2025 National Security Strategy links Europe’s future not only to security challenges but also to demographic, migratory, political and cultural concerns. The Trump administration presents these developments as threats to Western identity and civilisational continuity.
European governments do not necessarily share that interpretation. Their disagreements with Washington concern not only how to confront external threats, but also what the West should seek to preserve.
For the purposes of this analysis, the West is understood as a historically shaped political and cultural space, encompassing societies linked by overlapping historical traditions, cultural influences and political institutions, while remaining diverse in their values, interests and interpretations of what it means to belong to the West. Geopolitically, it is a network of states and institutions centred on the transatlantic relationship, whose combined military, economic, technological and diplomatic capabilities underpin their collective international influence.
The United States brings the strategic power of a superpower. Europe, considered collectively rather than as a unified state, represents a major economic and diplomatic centre, despite its fragmented foreign policy and strategic decision-making.
Defending a particular conception of Western civilisation is therefore not necessarily equivalent to preserving the relationships and institutions sustaining Western influence.
Nor should every Trump policy be understood as an attempt to defend Western civilisation. Many reflect American national priorities. The paradox emerges when policies intended to advance Washington’s interests place pressure on the cooperation through which the United States and Europe exercise influence together.
Ukraine: When Strategic Interests Diverge
The war in Ukraine illustrates the difficulties facing transatlantic coordination.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the United States and European countries have played essential roles in supporting Ukraine. Nevertheless, decisions taken during Trump’s second administration exposed differences over the diplomatic management of the conflict.
In February 2025, American and Russian officials held initial talks in Riyadh without Ukrainian or European representatives. The following month, Washington temporarily suspended military assistance and intelligence-sharing with Kyiv, reversing those measures after US–Ukrainian talks in Jeddah.
Although European governments remained involved in diplomatic efforts, these episodes exposed the limits of their influence over certain American decisions directly affecting European security.
The geopolitical concern is not direct diplomacy with Moscow, but whether Washington’s approach weakens the trust and coordination needed to sustain a common Western strategy.
Differences over security guarantees and the conditions of a possible settlement demonstrate that American and European priorities do not always coincide.
Such disagreements need not produce a rupture. Yet uncertainty over commitments can undermine the predictability required for diplomatic coordination and collective action, potentially reducing the ability of allies to influence international outcomes.
Western Cohesion Beyond NATO
The transatlantic relationship is frequently assessed through NATO and the distribution of military responsibilities.
Trump’s pressure for increased European defence spending has reinforced a longstanding debate about Europe’s responsibility for its own security. Higher expenditure may also benefit the American defence industry, given the United States’ position as a leading arms supplier to European countries.
A militarily stronger Europe could contribute to a more balanced and resilient partnership. Combined with credible American commitments and effective coordination, greater European capabilities could strengthen Western security.
But cohesion cannot be measured solely through defence budgets.
Political trust, diplomatic coordination and international credibility also determine the ability of the United States and Europe to build coalitions, sustain common initiatives and exercise soft power.
Both possess independent sources of international appeal. Nevertheless, persistent disagreements may affect how third countries perceive the reliability of their shared commitments, weakening their ability to project influence collectively without necessarily diminishing each side’s individual soft power.
Reduced cohesion does not necessarily mean diminished influence; the geopolitical cost emerges when disagreements prevent the United States and Europe from achieving objectives that neither could pursue as effectively alone.
Disagreement itself is not the problem. It becomes strategically consequential when it erodes trust and obstructs cooperation.
Economic Competition as a Strategic Challenge
Trade tensions introduce a different, potentially more enduring challenge.
Trump’s tariff policies intensified disputes between Washington and Brussels, although agreements reached in 2025 demonstrated that both sides retain the capacity to negotiate and compromise.
Economic competition between allies is neither new nor inherently incompatible with geopolitical cooperation. What is changing is the strategic significance of the sectors involved.
Semiconductors, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, energy and advanced industrial capabilities are simultaneously sources of prosperity and instruments of international power.
As critical technologies and industrial capabilities become increasingly important to national power, economic competition between allies overlaps with questions of strategic autonomy and security.
Washington may regard industrial renewal and technological leadership as essential to American power. European governments may pursue comparable objectives to reduce dependencies and improve competitiveness. Both strategies can be rational from their respective perspectives while generating friction within the transatlantic partnership.
China’s emergence as an industrial and technological power makes this challenge particularly significant. Washington and European governments do not share identical priorities or levels of economic dependence on Beijing. Their differences may complicate efforts to coordinate trade, industrial and technological policies towards a major strategic competitor.
The central risk is that competition over strategic industries may increasingly influence political decisions in areas where transatlantic cooperation remains essential.
A Trump-Era Crisis or a Structural Transformation?
Transatlantic relations have experienced serious crises since 1945, from Suez to disagreements surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Today’s tensions are notable for simultaneously affecting security, trade, diplomacy and competing political visions of the West.
They also coincide with changes in the international economic order, where control over critical technologies and industrial capabilities increasingly shapes the distribution of power.
It would nevertheless be mistaken to attribute these developments entirely to Trump.
American demands for greater European defence contributions have a long history. Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy also predates his return to the White House, as illustrated by the European Union’s Strategic Compass, adopted in 2022.
Similarly, competition over technologies, industrial capacity and supply chains reflects structural changes in the global economy.
Trump has intensified certain tensions, but he did not create every force reshaping the transatlantic relationship.
A future American administration might restore political confidence and more predictable cooperation. Yet diplomatic reconciliation would not necessarily eliminate economic and technological rivalries.
The United States and Europe could continue competing for markets, investment and industrial leadership while remaining strategic partners against shared threats.
Nor must this produce a weaker West. A more autonomous and capable Europe could strengthen the transatlantic partnership, provided greater European autonomy is accompanied by sustained political and strategic coordination.
The decisive question is whether both sides can establish a sustainable balance between autonomy, competition and cooperation.
Conclusion
Trump’s paradox lies in the possibility that, while championing the defence and renewal of the West, policies designed to advance American interests may be weakening strategic cohesion between the United States and Europe.
These tensions do not necessarily imply a transatlantic rupture. Yet their breadth and potential persistence raise questions about the ability of both sides to sustain common positions and international influence. Even a future restoration of political trust would not eliminate the structural pressures arising from economic and technological competition.
The future of Western power may depend less on eliminating differences between America and Europe than on ensuring that their growing competition does not undermine their capacity to act together.
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