GeoPrism

The past two weeks have witnessed renewed diplomatic activity in the Middle East. Amid US threats to renew strikes against Iran, representatives of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Türkiye met with their Iranian counterpart in Tehran for a meeting to discuss regional security and de-escalation amid the possibility of a new armed conflict.

Just a week before, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. They met in Tehran on October 19 to discuss regional concerns and bilateral cooperation. The Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which was signed in January 2025 and effective from October 2, 2025, provided the framework for their talks.

On October 27th, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held talks with Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The meeting took place on the sidelines of the eighth summit of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). Pezeshkian’s remarks after the talks are significant. “We can work on all the problems we have in the region and…resolve all regional issues without the United States,” he stated. “There is no need to rely on American assistance in the region.”

The Tehran meeting suggests an effort to build a regional channel for dialogue, while engagement with Moscow offers another avenue for political coordination.

Why do these meetings matter for Tehran, and what message is it ultimately conveying to Washington?

Recently, US President Donald Trump presented his Iran policy as a decision between military escalation and negotiation. “Do I make a deal with them, or do I finish them off?” he asked during a Fox News interview. His remarks reflect uncertainty about Washington’s next course of action. According to sources, Trump has expressed a willingness to delay more strikes until after the US midterm elections, scheduled for November 3.

In the Middle East, Netanyahu also used remarks like “Finish them off” towards Iran, indicating the military campaign he would renew with the US’s support. However, his party is facing a deadlock in the election, having fallen short of creating a unified government all by themselves.

Iran is pursuing diplomacy without ruling out military retaliation if attacked. Tehran repeatedly stated they want the US to comply with the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) reached in June. Yet, its adversaries are openly declaring military action against Tehran. Here, the “coercive diplomacy” that the US and its ally Israel are trying to pursue may well make the Middle East’s stability difficult to achieve.

Alexander L. George, a foundational scholar of coercive diplomacy, described it as a defensive strategy. It uses threats of violence, economic penalties, or other punitive measures, supported by a clear request, to convince an adversary to halt or retract an active aggressive action. However, some scholars also saw limited military action as a use of coercive diplomacy.

The idea of coercive diplomacy isn’t new. Throughout the twentieth century, many states have used it to deter further escalation. Two useful examples of its use were the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015). In both cases, the US and European powers in the latter case used this diplomatic policy to stop military action.

Although the JCPOA was short-lived and couldn’t resolve the conflict, it showed cooperation between Iran and P5+1. Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the US from the agreement in 2018, and it collapsed.

Trump’s approach combines economic pressure and threats of military action with the small possibility of negotiation, while Netanyahu has continued to advocate a hard-line approach towards Iran. In 2018, he put sanctions on the energy sector. On August 26, the Trump administration initiated “Operation Economic Outcast,” which focuses on Iran’s economy and financial sector. Trump has frequently utilised threats to wipe out Iran, which is rhetoric of coercive diplomacy. So, what has Trump used to support this policy?

As per the memorandum’s terms, Iran was tasked with organizing safe transit through the Strait. Iran accused the United States of unilaterally creating an alternative shipping route that avoided Iran’s coordination and insisted that vessels operate under escort along it, which Iran viewed as a breach of the agreement. When the US started bombing southern Iran, the agreement shattered completely.

On July 8, Donald Trump said the memorandum “is over.” This shows Iran can’t rely on the policy as Trump thinks it would do. Coercive diplomacy should offer incentives and assurances to the other state to comply with the agreements that are being accepted by both parties. Here the state that is trying to use this diplomatic approach is the one violating it.

The US may weaken the impact of coercive diplomacy by not offering trustworthy guarantees. But the complexity doesn’t stop here.

The midterm election is the only condition that’s holding Donald Trump from renewing the military campaign; in his words, “we may do another little epic fury.” Traditionally, it’s the Congress that holds the power to declare war and fund it; however, many US presidents waged limited military actions without Congressional authorization. Donald Trump is pushing towards keeping Congress under Republican rule. In Michigan, he urged people to vote for the Republican Party as if they were voting for him.

If the Democrats win, that may not change Donald Trump’s mind. According to various sources, Trump might start striking Iran as early as the announcement of the midterm election results. His core ally Netanyahu will likely join with the US to bomb Iran again.

So did the US even have any intention of diplomacy? The credibility of US coercive diplomacy is in question because its threats have not been matched by sufficiently credible assurance. The demands were agreed to and then violated by the same state that advocated for negotiation. The theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy demands credible incentives and assurances. Trump offered Iran threats rather than precise assurances.

Iran is using diplomatic channels with other regional players, meeting with Mecca Defense Pact members and the Russian President, amid ongoing discussions about regional stability. Iran’s involvement in the region could enhance its diplomatic position and maintain alternative avenues for collaboration, though the benefits will depend on whether the discussions result in tangible agreements.

Military superiority doesn’t always translate into a political settlement. The example of Iraq conveys this message. The US participation in the JCPOA was appreciated by everyone as diplomatic cooperation among the parties that opened a path for future settlement. Washington’s continued emphasis on military action, without meeting the criteria of coercive diplomacy, will make the conflict last longer.

The United States might still have the ability to cause significant harm to Iran, but this alone does not ensure that Tehran will comply with Washington’s requests or that the area will experience greater stability. Iran’s regional diplomacy might provide it with more flexibility, yet it cannot alone resolve the fundamental security conflicts if Washington and Tehran fail to create reliable conditions for de-escalation. The challenge of coercive diplomacy lies not in a state’s ability to threaten or penalize its opponent but in its capacity to transform that pressure into an agreement that both parties have an incentive to uphold.